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Peace building and the
depoliticisation of civil society: Sierra
Leone 2002–13
Simone Datzberger*
UNESCO Centre, School of Education, Ulster University, Coleraine, UK
Over the past two decades there has been a rapid increase in funds
for local civil society actors in fragile states. Current peace-building
and development efforts strive for the recreation of a vibrant, active
and ‘liberal’ civil society. In the case of Sierra Leone, paradoxically,
this growing support has not strengthened civil society actors based
on that liberal idea(l). Instead of experiencing enhanced proactive par-
ticipation stemming from the civil sphere, Sierra Leone’s civil society
appears to be largely depoliticised. Drawing on empirical data gath-
ered over the past four years, this article offers three interrelated cau-
sal explanations of why this phenomenon occurred during the
country’s peace-building phase from 2002 to 2013. First, Sierra
Leone’s civil society landscape has become instrumentalised to serve
a broader liberal peace-building and development agenda in several
ways. Second, Western idea(l)s of participatory approaches and
democracy are repeatedly challenged by the legacies of colonial rule
and socially entrenched forms of neo-patrimonialism. Third, abject
poverty and the lack of education affect activism and agency from
below.
Keywords: civil society; peace building; development; depoliticisation;
Sierra Leone
Introduction
Any form of conflict, be it a (civil) war, rebellion, revolt, insurgency or civil
uprising with the aim of destabilising persisting power structures, builds on the
hopes of manifesting socio-political change – in whatsoever type or shape.
Ensuing peace building, and consequently also development, processes are,
essentially, concerned about affecting the social, structural, political, economic
and/or cultural order of a society. These are undoubtedly highly complex and
lengthy processes interwoven in a web of historical, cultural and geographic
characteristics and events. Moreover, instituting socio-political change is ideally
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nurtured by a legitimising force – the people – by means of peaceful public con-
testation, deliberation and debate. This in turn presupposes granting all societal
segments political agency and voice. Seen from this admittedly liberal perspec-
tive, peace building and development are highly socio-political, albeit context-
specific processes impinging upon the political culture of a society as a whole.
But what if politics, understood hereafter as exerting influence, agency and
opposition, are removed from a conflict-, peace-building and/or development-
affected civil sphere? In the simplest terms people per se do not have the
opportunity to articulate their wants and needs. They lack control over their
own futures, destinies and lives.
This article seeks to critically examine how Sierra Leone’s civil sphere
became a subject of (re-)construction during the country’s peace-building and
development phase, how this affected the country’s civil society landscape or,
more broadly, the civil sphere.1 In doing so, it identifies and assesses a striking
paradox that occurred during the period from 2002 to 2013: even though liberal
peace-building and development efforts supported the (re-)creation of an active,
vibrant and independent civil society, unexpectedly this rising support has not
strengthened Sierra Leone’s civil society landscape based on that liberal intellec-
tual tradition and idea(l). On the contrary, during field research and interviews
conducted from 2010 to 2014, Sierra Leone’s civil society was predominantly
described as fragmented, lacking in power, influenced by the government, trib-
alised, dormant or weak.2 Nevertheless, the country’s civil sphere was repeatedly
portrayed as being removed from any form of political influence. Field research
further revealed that civil society in Sierra Leone struggles with a top-down
mentality among civil society organisations (CSOs) themselves and regionalism
expressed in a salient urban–rural divide. In short, after more than a decade of
what is generally praised as a successful peace-building process,3 Sierra Leone’s
civil society landscape appears to be by and large depoliticised. Surprisingly the
depoliticisation of Sierra Leone’s civil sphere has not been the subject of careful
deliberation or assessment by academics, practitioners or international and
national policy makers. By filling this void, this article will assess the issue as
follows. The first section broadly recapitulates how the interplay of civil society,
peace building and development is currently approached in practice and scholar-
ship. It briefly points to different strands of literature and how the concept of
civil society is applied and utilised in non-Western post-conflict contexts. Nota-
bly, the issue of depoliticisation remains a hitherto marginalised theme. The
ensuing part therefore engages in a succinct discussion on the concept of
depoliticisation and outlines how it will be approached and understood in the
remainder of the article. The empirical sections then assess why notable efforts
to strengthen Sierra Leone’s civil society landscape based on liberal idea(l)s in
the main did not manifest in enhancing democratic ownership, proactive partic-
ipation or advocacy stemming from the civil sphere.
Civil society in peace-building and development theory and practice
Over the past three decades scholarship, practice, policy making and program-
ming have been challenged by different approaches to peace building and
development and their respective theoretical frameworks.4 The normative as well







































as evidence-based debates revolving around ideal types or revisionist approaches
towards peace building and development are as longstanding as they are
numerous – ranging from liberal to post-liberal, local, communal, emancipatory,
hybrid, multicultural or social peace building, to name but a few.5 Strikingly,
when it comes to the role or potential of civil society in peace-building and
development processes, practitioners, as well as (critical) scholars from different
schools of thought, usually agree on one core argument: strengthening, support-
ing and involving local civil society actors, or more broadly the civil sphere,
has emerged as the legitimising toolkit for external and local efforts to engage
with post-conflict countries, build peace and foster development. In particular
after the end of the Cold War and during the 1990s the creation and consolida-
tion of CSOs surfaced as a central part of strategies for development and peace.
Prescriptions and slogans like ‘fostering civil society initiatives’ or ‘enhancing
civil society participation’ have arisen as key ingredients in the language of
peace-building agendas, priority plans and strategies.6 The promise and con-
struction of a vibrant and democracy-committed civil society in post-conflict
environments came to be seen as a key component of democratisation, peace-
building and development processes. Civil society simply emerged as ‘one of
those things (like development, education, or the environment) that no reason-
able person can be against. The only question to be asked of civil society today
seems to be: How do we get more of it?’7
Indeed, since the landmark 1992 UN document An Agenda for Peace, there
has been a ‘steady increase in the deployment of localism in the discourse and
practice of the liberal peace, together with actions by local communities to har-
ness, exploit, subvert and negotiate the internationally driven aspects of the local
turn’.8 Recent initiatives such as the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States
emphasise that ‘an engaged public and civil society, which constructively moni-
tors decision-making, is important to ensure accountability’.9 The New Deal’s
outcome document further emphasises the need for capacity building of civil
society and promotes a country-owned vision and plan in close consultation
with civil society actors.10
At the same time the number, involvement and activities of international
nongovernmental organisations (INGOs) and local CSOs have also augmented
across the developing world. The figures speak for themselves. There has been a
rapid increase in funds from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
(OECD) countries via CSOs. While in 1985–86 funding provided to CSOs
amounted to US$3.1 billion per year, it increased to $6.7 billion in 1999 and
$7.1 billion in 2001.11 In comparison, the UK Department for International
Development (DfID) reports that, in May 2013, it spent at least £694 million
through CSOs in the period 2011–12, of which £327 million were used by
CSOs in DfID’s country offices and £367 were channelled through the head-
quarters. In total £154 million went to Africa, £102 million to South Asia and
the remaining £71 million went to other countries such as Pakistan, Afghanistan,
Libya and Yemen.12 Likewise the United Nations Department of Economic and
Social Affairs (UNDESA) has established a relationship with over 30,000 CSOs
worldwide,13 while the World Bank reports to have increasingly involved CSOs
in the formulation of Country Assistance Strategies (CAS) and Poverty
Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs).14







































The above trends were accompanied, if not to an extent fostered, by a rich
body of academic research examining the (re-)construction, role and functions
of local civil societies (and organisations) in building a deeply embedded peace
into a society as a whole.15 Critical voices of the liberal peace-building and
development agenda have continuously shed light on issues of societal exclu-
sion, local resistance, marginalisation, structural barriers and unequal power rela-
tions (at the local, regional and international levels).16 It is repeatedly argued
that peace-building and development assistance has to be more context-specific
and culturally sensitive in engaging with and supporting post-conflict civil soci-
eties. However, since local practices may interfere with the ethics of liberal and
universal idea(l)s (such as human rights), scholars also caution against over-
romanticising the potential of local (civil) societies and encourage awareness of
potential peace spoilers within the civil sphere.17 This further led to the ethical
dilemma of who actually is to determine the good and bad parts of civil society?
In the quest for answers, repeated calls for emancipatory, culturally attuned,
transformative or even social peace-building and development practices rarely
offer alternative options to liberal agendas in fragile states.18 Rather, they are
much more an extension of liberal values and idea(l)s.19 What is more, whereas
current critical discourse states the need to give voice to alternative, oppressed
actors, most peace-building literature neither analyses these alternative voices
nor examines how and where they are socially engineered.20 In other words, the
socio-historical and therefore also socio-political rationalities of peace-building
and development processes are frequently overlooked. This is unfortunate, as
precisely these voices, and the ways in which they are socially manufactured
over history and time, may open up new vistas in peace-building and
development theory and practice.
In addition, civil society, as an intellectual construct of 18th- and 19th-
century capitalist Western society, has never really matched the realities of social
and political life in fragile states outside the Occidental world. There is very lit-
tle critique of, or thorough reflection upon, the consequences of importing and
appropriating a liberal notion of civil society to non-Western post-conflict
regions.21 In particular, accounts of the role, functions, potentials or activities of
civil society in peace-building processes seem frequently to be detached from a
considerable body of (predominantly postcolonial) literature that questions the
usefulness of a Eurocentric deployment of civil society in non-Western environ-
ments.22 Occidental conceptualisations commonly embrace civil society as inde-
pendent from the state, political, private and economic spheres but in close
interaction with them, as well as a domain of social life in which public opinion
can be formed. However, as argued elsewhere, in the sub-Saharan African
region civil society has to be contextualised to local realities to really hold a
key to explaining and addressing more effectively the long-term needs of a con-
flict-shattered society.23 This implies giving firm consideration of factors such as
the legacy of the slave trade and colonialism, urban versus rural areas, local ver-
sus elite ownership, neo-patrimonial networks and chiefdom systems, direct and
indirect (customary) rule and law, and the political culture and cultural identities
of a society, among other things.24
Nonetheless, externally steered efforts to bring about peace, democratisation
and development in the region seldom contemplate the colonial legacy of







































century-long oppression when it comes to the (re)-construction and formation of
local civil spheres. As a result, civil society is predominantly embraced as a pro-
mised agenda for change, as opposed to examining its actual socio-historical
configuration and formation.25 In short, despite the widespread critique of how
local (civil) societies lack agency and voice during liberal transitions from con-
flict to peace, the local context of civil society as well as an understanding of it
on its own terms remains an under-researched terrain. Accordingly we are left
with a considerable shortage of studies examining how local political culture,
agency and voice within the civil sphere are de facto socially engineered beyond
the rhetoric of liberal or post-liberal peace-building and development paradigms.
With these critical reflections in mind, this article examines why, in the course
of Sierra Leone’s peace-building and development processes, societal segments
not only lack agency and voice but are also at risk of being removed from
political influence or decision-making processes. Before doing so, however, it is
necessary to clarify how the term ‘depoliticisation’ will be conceptually applied
and used.
Peace building and the dilemma of depoliticising civil society
Supporting civil society actors in the attempt to foster peace, democratisation and
development inevitably leads to the construction of a particular kind of social
order, organised around the individual and his or her own rights.26 This, in turn,
affects the political culture of a society which, depending on a country’s socioeco-
nomic and historical context, might or might not have led to conflict in the first
place. From a liberal perspective post-conflict state–society relations ideally
would not only overcome such possible socio-political, historical or economic ten-
sions but also lead to the formation of an active civil society that can effectively
deal with and be a watchdog for the peace-building and development process of a
conflict-ravaged country. But what if, in the aftermath of a conflict and despite the
growing support for civil society landscapes, liberal idea(l)s of a vibrant,
politically independent and engaging civil society simply do not unfold? To begin
with, and because of a severe scarcity of definitions in the peace-building and
development literature on what depoliticisation might actually mean and entail, I
understand the concept as
a process that removes specific actors (civil society or, more broadly the civil
sphere) gradually from any form of political influence. As a consequence, pro-
cesses of political deprivation affect the political nature and culture of a society
while at the same time the political culture of a society can also influence the
degree of political activism or willingness to advocate for a need or cause.
Depoliticisation can also reflect or even cause political neutralisation expressed in
the sheer lack of interest in politics. Whereas liberalism would recognise a politi-
cal civil sphere as independent from the state, a depoliticised civil sphere would
no longer be an independent and legitimizing watchdog of or advocate for specific
governmental actions and policies. Instead, actors are prone to being instrumen-
talised by the state or other external players to serve a government’s agenda and
political aims.
Put simply, a depoliticised civil society encompasses both neutralisation (or
apolitical attitudes) and political capture. The latter can also refer to processes







































of instrumentalisation, either by external actors or through local dynamics of
neo-patrimonialism and clientelism. Some critics would perhaps now allege that
the dynamics inherent in neo-patrimonialism or clientelism are as depoliticising
as they are sheer manifestations of local, context-specific or non-Western poli-
tics.27 The counter-argument presented here is two-fold. First, there is consensus
in the literature that variations of instrumentalisation, neo-patrimonialism and
patron–clientelism occur in Western political cultures in the same way that they
take place in the sub-Saharan African context.28 Hence, they are not distinctive
to sub-Saharan African countries alone. Echoing the African scholar Lum-
bumba-Kasongo, there is a need to surmount assumptions that African (civil)
societies will not appreciate politics based on normative idea(l)s of participatory
democratic rule. Rather, the centre of critique should be how processes of creat-
ing rules, norms and institutionalisation are being hijacked by political elites.29
Second, and building on this point, instrumentalisation, neo-patrimonialism and
patron–clientelism, in whatever form or context, are exclusionary in nature.
Whereas a small segment of a society is empowered (or captured) by political
elites, the majority of the population (or civil sphere) is deprived of any form of
agency, voice or opposition as a result of hierarchical and opportunistic power
structures.
Thus far only a few scholars have implicitly or explicitly hinted at the
depoliticisation effects occurring during several stages of peace-building and
development endeavours.30 The most common line of reasoning highlights the
way that civil society actors are manoeuvred, if not instrumentalised, into
activities and areas in which they undertake duties that complement or carry out
functions that the government is too weak, incapable or unwilling to perform.
Instead of affecting political decision-making processes about peace-building-
and development-related issues affecting the future of a country, it is repeatedly
argued that civil society mainly has a humanitarian influence.31 In part this trend
can be also observed in the Sierra Leonean case. The ensuing section will illus-
trate how, even if local CSOs benefit from funding schemes targeting advocacy
work or human rights, their activities rather tend to train or educate the local
population as opposed to challenging local politics, behaviour and traditions that
stand in stark contradiction to universal human rights. In common with many
other post-conflict societies around the world, liberal attempts to support and
strengthen local civil society landscapes have become a vicious circle of aid
dependency, severely affecting the establishment of a public social welfare sys-
tem and shifting responsibility towards the global and local civil sphere. The
fight against Ebola since spring 2014 in West Africa serves as a dreadful prime
example, with public health care systems in the region least equipped to deal
with it. Instead local governments rely heavily on the help of global civil society
actors (eg Médecins Sans Frontières) or Western donors.32
At the time of writing there were only two notable contributions with a
specific focus on the recreation of civil society in the peace-building process of
Sierra Leone.33 In the broadest sense both authors share the abovementioned
consensus in the literature: they mainly locate the causes of depoliticising soci-
etal transformations from below in external interventionism alone. While draw-
ing on their valuable insights and findings, it will be argued that the Sierra
Leonean case reveals the need to further expand this causal explanation and







































approach. The ensuing empirical section will introduce two additional dynamics,
distinct from external interventionism, that tend to be frequently overlooked
when it comes to assess why in peace-building and development processes civil
societies often lack political agency and voice.
Peace building and the depoliticisation of civil society in Sierra Leone
(2002–13)
This analysis draws on qualitative and quantitative data, which was gathered by
the author in 2010–14. Qualitative data were obtained through interviews with
41 CSOs (of which two were INGOs run by locals), five Community Based
Organisations (CBOs) and local grassroots associations, eight youth and street
clubs, two communities, three Sierra Leonean scholars in the fields of political
science, history and peace and conflict studies, two government officials, and
one female Paramount Chief, as well as numerous informal conversations with
ordinary Sierra Leoneans from the civil sphere. Given that some interviewees
requested anonymity, the identity of CSOs and interviewees will not be dis-
closed. All interviews were semi-structured but revolved around the same set of
questions during both field research stays. In addition an extensive mapping
analysis was compiled at the beginning of 2011 and regularly updated until
March 2014. This not only informs the figures displayed below but also serves
as a quantitative tool to compare the representation and agenda setting of local
versus international CSOs in the ongoing peace-building and development
process. The mapping encompasses in total 358 registered CSOs of which 213
are local CSOs and 145 INGOs.34
In Sierra Leone, as in many other post-conflict countries, the construction of
a strong and vibrant civil society in post-conflict environments came to be seen
as an important component of the democratisation, peace-building and develop-
ment process of the country. CSOs, CBOs and informal or home-grown youth
clubs and associations mushroomed during the civil war (1991–2002).35 Since
the end of the conflict there has been a rapid increase in funds for local civil
society actors. In 2006 CSOs and INGOs received, in total, 26% of non- and
actual Official Development Assistance (ODA) to carry out activities in Sierra
Leone.36 Moreover, in 2005 DfID set up a flagship project called Enhancing the
Interface between Civil Society and the State to improve Poor People’s Life
(ENCISS). During its first five years of existence (2005–10) it cost the British
government almost £8.5 million, with a commitment of a further £4.5 million
between 2011 and 2013.37 In addition, all three consecutive PRSPs drafted by
the government in conjunction with the World Bank and IMF recognised the
importance of civil society in Sierra Leone’s peace-building and development
process. At the same time CSOs felt that access to funding for civil society
activities and actors was much easier in the years shortly after the war than
now.
That said, one of the most striking findings during both periods of field
research was that, after more than 10 years of peace-building and development
assistance – accompanied by strong rhetoric and significant funding to support
local civil society actors – a large majority of interviewees depicted Sierra
Leone’s civil society landscape as very lively and vibrant during and shortly







































after the conflict, yet described how it became gradually dormant and politically
inactive later on. When posed the question, ‘How would you describe civil soci-
ety in Sierra Leone?’, by and large Sierra Leone’s civil society was described as
depoliticised. Some of the most salient answers in this regard are summarised in
Table 1. Ironically the majority of CSOs complaining about the lack of an active
and vibrant civil society were themselves frequently close to political parties
and/or local chiefs, as well as being heavily dependent on the generosity and
agenda-setting of their donors. Only a minority of interviewees gave critical yet
far more moderate answers.
Interviews with Sierra Leonean academics generally described Sierra
Leone’s civil sphere as characterised by tribalism and political party loyalism,
with no independent press. Civil society, in one lecturer’s view, was ‘toothless’
and lacked ‘a proactive focus’ and initiatives.38 Respondents often located the
turning point when CSOs appear to have changed in character as the time after
the 2007 elections. As one Sierra Leone scholar observes:
With the change of government in 2007 civil society has taken a back row. For
instance previously politically active organisations took a back seat. They focus
now more on the reform of the chiefdom system and don’t give prominence to
issues such as corruption or issues of service delivery. They should challenge the
government more. Also, a lot of local CSOs have started to align themselves with
the government; even women’s groups that used to be very active are now taking
a back seat.39
This observation also extends to Sierra Leone’s pre-war student movements and
lively political activism, which took place and shaped the university culture as
well as the political climate and environment over decades before the country’s
civil war. Forah Bay College, once the country’s intellectual and political
vanguard and de facto opposition to Siaka Stevens’ one-party state (1971-–85)
Table 1. ‘How would you describe civil society in Sierra Leone?’
‘Civil society in Sierra Leone is influenced by the government. In general civil society is not too powerful.
Civil society is supposed to be an opposition to the government, but actually, it is not.’
‘Some CSOs are simply a mouthpiece of the government. They take on sides and are highly political
[meant as allied with one of the two main political parties].’ ‘In some meetings the government jokingly
refers to civil society as “evil” society, when CSOs make people aware of their rights and challenge
authorities.’
‘Only a few organisations are vibrant and strong. The majority needs to have a clearer focus, direction,
credibility and accountability.’
‘People only make noise for their own agenda but not for other issues, given the bad economic situation of
the country. Project proposals often differ from the truth and represent a different picture to justify
proposals.’
‘There is a tendency of CSOs in taking sides. CSOs only exercise politics if it fits their interest. Sixty per
cent of CSOs only talk. Forty per cent of all CSOs act on their own interest. A lot of CSOs are dormant
by now. Sierra Leone has many briefcase CSOs. There is a lot of corruption going on.’
Some are playing the music of the government, those can’t be seen as civil society. When they go on radio
they call themselves a niche, but they are not. Some of them praise officially the government on the
radio.’
‘That is a difficult question. It is difficult to distinguish between civil society and state actors in Sierra
Leone. A good number of CSOs are too close to the state actors, there are a few vibrant ones but there
are the ones that are absorbed in politics.’







































during his rule has become silent during the country’s peace-building and
development phase since 2002. For Gardner the university itself has slid into
apparently irreversible decline in that ‘material conditions have atrophied almost
continuously since the civil war ended in 2002, and campus accommodation is
now uninhabitable to the extent that even students from the farthest provinces
are denied lodgings’.40
Political party loyalism, tribalism and ethnicism have eaten deeply into stu-
dent life. A Sierra Leonean scholar was asked what in his view caused this
recent development of an inactive, if not dormant and depoliticised civil society,
be this among CSOs, students or more generally in the public sphere.41 In reply
he argued:
If you have a liberal regime that is open to criticism civil society can flourish.
Otherwise, it tends to be passive. In Sierra Leone the newspapers are champions
for the government. In the last two years or so they became the mouthpiece of the
government.
The current vanishing freedom and impartiality of the press was not only recon-
firmed in interviews but also during several informal conversations. Further, on 21
October 2013 Reuters reported that the Sierra Leone editor of the Independent
Observer and a local journalist had been arrested by the Sierra Leone People’s
Party (SLP) for publishing an article which compared President Ernest Bai
Koroma to a rat. The event stirred many concerns over press freedom in the coun-
try.42 Almost simultaneously, the latest Freedom House study (2014) held that
Sierra Leone’s status had declined from ‘Free’ (in 2012) to ‘Partly Free’ (in 2014)
as a result of persistent problems with corruption and lack of transparency.43
In addition, several CSOs pointed to the fact that some individuals use the
status of their organisation as a stepping-stone to enter state politics or benefit
from governmental support in one way or another. A recent study conducted by
Oxfam, Civil Society Engagement with Political Parties during Elections,
reached out to political parties in Sierra Leone in order to gather their views on
the activities and work of local CSOs. According to the report, political parties
were concerned about the existence of numerous so-called ‘briefcase CSOs’.
One interviewee claimed that many CSOs also changed their address or disap-
peared, as there was no structured funding. Interviewees further reasoned that
increased donor support implicitly encouraged locals to found a CBO or CSO
for no other purpose than income generation.44
In light of the above it is thus worth asking what has happened to Sierra
Leone’s civil society, in particular during the later stages of the peace-building
process. Concretely, why is Sierra Leone’s civil society at risk of being
gradually depoliticised?
Instrumentalisation of civil society in peace-building and development
processes
In the scope of both periods of field research the majority of interviewees under-
scored that, during the conflict, CSOs emerged as (humanitarian) actors who
complemented services the government was either too weak or unwilling to pro-
vide. According to one interviewee, ‘While the CSO landscape exploded during







































that time, most organisations did not realise that this was to be a constant
commitment’.45 In this regard all CSOs were posed the question ‘Do you think
that your organisation covers areas that should be tackled by the government or
even the international community? If so, what areas; if not – why?’ Almost all
CSOs answered the question in the affirmative. In the main areas that should be
tackled by the Government of Sierra Leone (GoSL) included: healthcare
services, water and sanitation, support for disadvantaged women, education
(children and adult), training, workshops and sensitisation programmes for chiefs
and communities, community development, and agriculture.
In order to get a much clearer picture of the magnitude and variety of the
activities local and international CSOs were engaging in, the author conducted a
mapping of registered CSOs and INGOs according to their activities. The map-
ping identified 358 formally registered civil society organisations in Sierra
Leone as of March 2014, of which 213 were local CSOs and 145 INGOs. The
results are presented in Figure 1.
Taking into account Sierra Leone’s low Human Development Index rank
(183 out of 187 in 2013), it does not come as a surprise that communal, human
and social development appears to be the largest engagement area. The wide
spectrum of activities generally includes water supply, nutrition programmes,
healthcare, education, rehabilitation plans and stimulating local forms of busi-
nesses and employment generation. Notably interviews with local CSOs working
on human rights-related issues brought to light that, by and large, their activities
more closely resembled service provision (human rights training or legal assis-
tance) than advocacy or confronting authorities with human rights violations.
Similarly, it was further emphasised that Sierra Leone’s Unions are very weak
and lack the capacity to lobby for their concerns. The author’s findings corre-
spond well with the aforementioned Oxfam study from 2013, which identified
Figure 1. Local CSOs and INGOs mapping per activity, as at March 2014.
Sources: Data for the mapping analysis was retrieved and compiled from United Nations
Integrated Peacebuilding Support Office Sierra Leone; United Nations Office of the
Special Advisor on Africa; Global Hand, Directory of Development Organisations in
Sierra Leone Vol. I.B. Africa Edition, 2010; and Accountability Alert Sierra Leone.







































several striking challenges for CSOs in trying to influence political parties in
Sierra Leone. These are:
• fragmentation among CSOs such that they have an inconsistent voice on
issues;
• poor engagement skills, which limit their persuasiveness;
• lack of innovation;
• insufficient human and financial resources to maintain engagement after
elections.46
Correspondingly Cormack-Hale critiques past and ongoing efforts to rebuild
Sierra Leone’s civil society landscape as problematic, since democratisation and
development objectives actually ‘undermine the overarching policy objective of
rebuilding and strengthening the failed state’.47 In her view, this has led to a
counterproductive phenomenon in Sierra Leone: strengthening CSOs did not
lead to corresponding increases in state capacity. Cubitt, too, contends that
external policy interventions targeting Sierra Leone’s civil society distorted
democracy and removed accountability from the local sphere.48 In principle, this
article agrees with the general criticism that externally led peace-building and
development interventions instrumentalised Sierra Leone’s civil sphere. Clearly
CSOs emerged as a safety net to deal with the casualties of a liberal peace-
building and development course. Yet one has to be careful not to over simplify
the causes of depoliticisation. First, it remains frequently disregarded that local
civil society actors also manoeuvred themselves into a position to supply ser-
vices that the GoSL has thus far lacked the capacity and/or political will to pro-
vide. Without denying the philanthropic intent and extremely important work of
these organisations, working or founding a CSO is certainly an opportunity for
income generation, as well as a means of acquiring local prestige. As noted ear-
lier, the existence of numerous briefcase CSOs, as well as notorious corruption
within CSOs, elucidates how ostensible civil actors instrumentalised their own
country’s mushrooming civil society landscape to make ends meet.
Second, recalling earlier discussions on the conceptualisation and usage of
civil society in the sub-Saharan African context, the socio-historical dynamics of
a society should not be dismissed. The country’s political culture, in the shad-
ows of a hitherto bifurcated state,49 remains an overlooked entry point in the
attempt to understand why civil society takes on a different political dimension
in the context of non-Western states.
Cultural particularism, political culture and the bifurcated state
Sierra Leone’s history of state formation, the decade-long civil war and the
ensuing peace-building and development efforts shaped the country’s civil
sphere and social fabrics in seemingly ambiguous ways. Compared to societies
in the West, Sierra Leone is a country full of socially entangled dualisms
grounded in the intersections of primordial and civic everyday actions, realities
and spheres. Despite (external) efforts to liberalise societal structures and local
politics, primordial and civic juxtapositions linger within the civil sphere to this
day. Numerous examples help to better illustrate this point: official law is still
challenged by the uncertain and illiberal nature of widely practised and accepted







































customary law. Chiefs are struggling with the power given to local councillors,
while local councillors may feel a certain loyalty towards their chiefs. Gender
equality campaigns are frequently run by women who belong to secret societies
favouring the practice of female genital mutilation. Hospitals and medical
INGOs operate next to traditional medicine men. Youth complain about inter-
generational power imbalances and patriarchal societal structures while shower-
ing community elders with deference and respect. Before the war thousands of
civilians successfully demonstrated for the reinstitution of a multiparty system,
whereas today Sierra Leone’s political parties hardly differ in their ideological
viewpoints and beliefs. Liberal values such as democracy and good governance
are praised, even though clientelism, neo-patrimonialism and patronage are toler-
ated and continue to exist. CSOs complaining about the lack of an active and
vibrant civil society are themselves frequently close to political parties and/or
local chiefs, as well as being heavily dependent on the generosity and agenda-
setting of their donors. Above all, externally led efforts to strengthen and
empower local civil society actors by means of a liberal agenda have inadver-
tently bolstered societal arrangements reflecting primordial features of tribalism,
ethnicity and regionalism.
In other words, the characteristics of any civil sphere are deeply rooted
within the history of state formation. In the Sierra Leonean case the British colo-
nial administrative method of indirect rule (1800–1961) reconfigured local politi-
cal hierarchies through capitalist and governmental penetration, but many local
features and political and social practices remained, including chieftaincy
(though distorted or misused by the British), spiritual beliefs, judicial and land
practices and secret societies.50 Although democratic institutions have more-or-
less successfully been established since the end of the war, the country’s civil
sphere remains largely embedded in neo-patrimonial and/or religious networks
and tribalism. Sierra Leone’s civil sphere is characterised by a salient socially
and culturally embedded consensus about the duty to shower community elders
and chiefs with loyalty and respect – even though their actions may not be to
the benefit of all.
Some interviewees spoke of the urgent need to reform the chieftaincy sys-
tem to make it more responsive to social and economic realities at the grassroots
level but still referred to it as a cultural outfit that needs to be maintained. Then
again, the widespread acceptance of patronage, clientilism and big men mentali-
ties rests upon a societal logic that interlinks social, political and economic
spheres much more tightly than in Western societies. Independent actions or
decisions by community members would certainly risk social exclusion, enor-
mous tensions and, in the worst case, being expelled from communal life. Social
networks are crucial to everything from employment opportunities to ritual
initiations to individual identity. ‘People do not have relations they are rela-
tions’.51 Consequently the individual as an autonomous social actor is chal-
lenged by a political tradition of the collective as the true ethical and moral
entity. It is important to emphasise at this point, however, that this observation
should not be misinterpreted as suggesting that Sierra Leone’s civil sphere lacks
the determination for emancipation and transformation from below. In fact, quite
the opposite is the case. Sierra Leoneans are presently in the midst of renegotiat-
ing societal intersections of the primordial and civil sphere and, consequently,







































the nature and characteristics of state–society relations and communal life. The
mushrooming of CSOs and CBOs during the conflict led to an interesting ancil-
lary effect: an increasing intersection of a primordial (traditional) and civic
(based on Western liberalism) public within the civil sphere. How values and
norms that constitute a liberal civil society are going to be socially entrenched
in the long haul should be task of the Sierra Leonean civil sphere and not the
Western researcher and practitioner, however. Yet, as the Sierra Leonean case
unmistakably shows, such an organic progression cannot take root if the average
Sierra Leonean is deprived of basic physiological needs.
Voices from the civil sphere: education to foster social transformation
Societal transformation stemming from the grassroots level in any form can only
take root if certain basic needs are met. Despite considerable support from the
international community, Sierra Leone remains among the poorest places on
earth. Even with economic growth, overall poverty reduction has had only mar-
ginal success. Current life expectancy is low, almost half of the population is
illiterate, child mortality rates are high and every fifth woman dies from pre-
ventable complications during birth or pregnancy – to list only a few of Sierra
Leone’s present development dilemmas. The country’s high dependence on aid,
arguably one of the legacies of century-long slave trade and colonial rule,
impedes self-sufficient development in various areas and aspects of everyday life.
This clearly also hampers grassroots agency and voice. During a discussion about
Sierra Leone’s problems of food shortages in the rural areas, one CSO director
stated, ‘Peace is food. You cannot have peace when you are hungry.’52 The
principles of fundamental human needs were famously defined by Maslow.53
Thus, if basic needs such as food, shelter and security are not taken care of, a
population will be tremendously weakened in striving for self-actualisation and
empowerment. As one interviewee noted about the challenges encountered in
doing advocacy work, ‘Before you even start talking, people ask you already:
what do you have for me?’54 Especially in Freetown, the same person noted,
civil society actors encounter the difficulty that people neither have the time nor
the leisure to ‘listen to your talk’. Their first priority is to make an income in
whatever way they can. Needless to say, CSOs often provide incentives (eg food
and beverages) before they even start with their work. Widespread poverty affects
political activism, if not mobilisation strategies for a particular cause, in several
respects.
In an attempt to get a much clearer impression about people’s everyday
concerns and needs, the field research took inspiration from the World Bank’s
trilogy, Voices of the Poor. The aim was to give voice to locals and gain more
knowledge about the priorities of ordinary Sierra Leoneans (the civil sphere)
during the peace-building and development phase in their country. In this
attempt all interviewees were asked: ‘If you had three wishes for the future of
your country, what would they be?’ Their answers are summarised in Figure 2.
Of course, they are not representative of Sierra Leone as a whole. Rather,
Figure 2 epitomises the voices of 179 respondents, which include not only
people from CSOs, CBOs and associations but also group interviews with
home-grown youth clubs, communities or individuals the author approached and







































spoke to in the street. The random sampling notwithstanding, responses reflect
the findings of a countrywide opinion poll conducted by the Freetown-based
CEDSA in 2009, which also ranked education as top.
Figure 2 leads to one central observation, namely that the first three priori-
ties (education, democracy and good governance, and youth empowerment and
employment generation) embrace areas of fundamental social change. In other
words, they all lean towards transformative peace-building and development
paradigms.55 This is particularly interesting as the root causes of Sierra Leone’s
structural violence are, among other factors, manifested in the unequal relation-
ship between the grassroots population and a privileged few. In conjunction with
CEDSA’s opinion poll, Figure 2 illustrates how ordinary Sierra Leoneans would
like to seek autonomy and self-sufficiency to equalise those power relationships.
In so doing, the majority of respondents listed education as their top wish. The
importance placed on education was not only prevalent during several inter-
views, but also in the scope of many informal conversations throughout both
research stays. An OECD report on civil society and international development
rightly states that ‘lack of education stops a great majority of Africans from
being citizens in their own right’.56 Schools are indeed the birthplace for a
(civil) society to flourish in, enabling people at the individual and collective
level to articulate and advocate their concerns and needs. In interviews with
youth clubs education was usually perceived as being empowered to ‘be’ or ‘be-
come somebody’, as was vocational training. The clear wish to have a certain
control over one’s own life and future was a recurring theme during focus group
discussions and interviews with youth clubs and communities. Yet, for most
young people in Sierra Leone, such control, as well as freedom of choice, was a
privilege they may never have. At the time of writing, only 43.3% of all Sierra
Leoneans are reported to be literate.57 By and large the GoSL’s response, but
also that of the international community, towards the country’s public educa-
tional systems has been disappointing. Although there has been a rapid growth
in the number of children who complete primary school since the end of the
war, there are still deep inefficiencies in the quality of education.
Figure 2. ‘Wish list’ of all interviewees in Sierra Leone, 2011–12.







































Conclusion and further implications
The aim of this article was to set forth the argument that a society cannot be
reconstructed, or strengthened, based on an externally introduced idea(l) but
instead through building upon the historically, culturally and socioeconomically
embedded characteristics that are already part of existing societal experiences.
After more than 10 years of peace-building and on-going development efforts
based on a liberal agenda, Sierra Leone’s civil society landscape operates much
more as a subsystem of state politics rather than independently challenging
governance and political decision making from the outside. In this regard three
distinct yet interrelated phenomena were identified in order to explain why
processes of depoliticisation during Sierra Leone’s peace-building process
occurred. These include the instrumentalisation of the country’s civil society
landscape, the legacies of colonial rule and socially entrenched forms of
neo-patrimonialism, as well as abject poverty and a lack of education.
The absence of political influence can be dangerous in two ways. It not only
fosters sentiments of frustration and anger but, in the long term, can even trigger
new forms of conflict, resistance or violent unrest. However, it must be empha-
sised that the above-discussed phenomenon of depoliticisation should not dis-
tract from the tremendous efforts of Sierra Leonean civil society actors to build
peace and contribute to the country’s developmental process. Nor was the inten-
tion to argue that Sierra Leone’s civil sphere remains depoliticised or that local
processes of re-politicisation of whatever type and form may not occur. Rather,
the aim was to highlight why processes of depoliticisation occur during peace
building and development and, above all, why ordinary people lack agency and
voice. In this regard there are at least two implications for future research to be
drawn from the Sierra Leonean experience. First, more research is necessary on
civil society actors and service delivery in fragile sates. Are there clear interlink-
ages between a growing civil society landscape (including INGOs) and the
retreat of the state and to what new forms of governance will this lead? Second,
Sierra Leone’s history of state formation, the decade long civil war and the
ensuing peace-building and development efforts shaped the country’s civil
sphere and social fabrics in seemingly ambiguous ways. Compared to societies
in the West, it is a country full of socially entangled dualisms grounded in the
intersections of primordial everyday actions, realities and spheres. When it
comes to the sub-Saharan African region there is a clear shortage of research on
whether and how such processes of societal renegotiation take place and take
hold. A careful observation of such processes of renegotiation would allow us
to get a much better understanding of whether and how externally introduced
liberal values and norms are socially and politically entrenched and reproduced
over the long haul.
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Notes
1. For the purposes of this article the concepts of ‘civil society’ and ‘civil sphere’ are used interchangeably.
A critical discussion on the appropriation of both terms to the sub-Saharan African region can be found
in Datzberger, “Civil Society in sub-Saharan African Post-conflict States.”
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Effectivness in Busan, Korea (November 29 – December 1 2011). For more information see: http://www.
newdeal4peace.org.
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13. See http://www.un.org/en/civilsociety/, accessed January 4, 2015.
14. World Bank, Civil Society Background 2014. http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/
CSO/0,,contentMDK:20093161~menuPK:220423~pagePK:220503~piPK:220476~theSitePK:228717,00.
html.
15. See, for instance, Paffenholz, Civil society & Peacebuilding.
16. See, for instance, Richmond, “A Post-liberal Peace”; Nadarajah and Rampton, “The Limits of Hybridity”;
and Wennmann, Aid Effectiveness.
17. Mac Ginty, “Gilding the Lily?”; and Narten, “Dilemmas of Promoting Local Ownership.”
18. This point was also put forward by Paffenholz, Civil Society & Peacebuilding, 55.
19. Paris, “Saving Liberal Peacebuilding.”
20. Paffenholz, Civil Society & Peacebuilding, 56.
21. Datzberger, “Civil Society in sub-Saharan African Post-conflict States”; Lewis Civil Society in Non-Western
Contexts; and Williams and Young, “Civil Society and the Liberal Project.”
22. See, for instance, Chabal and Daloz, Africa Works; Chatterjee The Politics of the Governed; Comaroff
and Comaroff, Civil Society and the Political Imagination; Ferguson, Global Shadows; Harbeson et al.,
Civil Society and the State in Africa; Kaviraj and Khilnani, Civil Society; Lewis, Civil Society in Non-
Western Contexts; and Mamdani, Citizen and Subject.
23. Datzberger, “Civil Society in sub-Saharan African post-conflict States.”
24. Ibid.
25. Cf. Mamdani, Citizen and Subject, 19.
26. Barkawi and Laffey, Democracy, Liberalism, and War.
27. As for instance argued by Chabal and Daloz, Africa Works.
28. See, for instance, Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture; and Güneş-Ayata and Roniger, Democracy,
Clientelism and Civil Society.
29. Lumumba-Kasongo, Liberal Democracy and its Critics.
30. Goetschel and Hagmann, “Civilian Peacebuilding”; Holmén, Snakes in Paradise; Howell and Pearce,
Civil Society and Development; and Verkoren and van Leeuwen, “Complexities and Challenges for Civil
Society Building.”
31. Jaeger, “‘Global Civil Society’.”
32. Denney, “Ebola cannot easily be cured but West Africa Crisis may have been Preventable.” Guardian,
July 8, 2014.







































33. Cubitt, “Constructing Civil Society”; and Cormack-Hale “Partners or Adversaries?”
34. Because of the unpredictable nature inherent in both the institutional life of INGOs and CSOs and their
funding allocations from donors, it is acknowledged that the mapping is not fully complete and is there-
fore subject to change.
35. In many interviews the wartime period was described as the key moment for CSOs and civil movements
to arise. Apart from numerous local civilian initiatives to negotiate peace at grassroots level, to report
human rights abuses or to provide humanitarian assistance and relief, Sierra Leone’s broader civil sphere
also mustered a will of steel to bring the conflict to an end. One of the most prominent examples
includes the May 2000 demonstrations outside RUF rebel leader Foday Sankoh’s house, in which about
30,000 people participated.
36. Cormack-Hale, “Partners or Adversaries?,” 141–142.
37. Cubitt, “Constructing Civil Society,” 101.
38. Interview, lecturer, Fourah Bay College, Freetown, August 15, 2012.
39. Interview, Head of Department, Fourah Bay College, Freetown, August 18, 2012.
40. Gardner, “Fourah Bay College: The Decline of Sierra Leone’s Oxford in the Bush.” February 18, 2014,
in blog by Mats Utas. https://matsutas.wordpress.com/2014/02/18/fourah-bay-college-the-decline-of-
sierra-leones-oxford-in-the-bush-by-tom-gardner/, accessed June 10, 2015.
41. Interview, Head of Department, Fourah Bay College.
42. “Sierra Leone Editor arrested for comparing President to Rat.” Reuters, October 21, 2013. http://www.reu
ters.com/article/2013/10/21/us-leone-rat-idUSBRE99K0QN20131021.
43. http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2014#.UyQ12ZyluQE, accessed Novem-
ber 15, 2014.
44. Oxfam, Civil Society Engagement.
45. Interview, director, Freetown, July 8, 2011.
46. Oxfam, Civil Society Engagement.
47. Cormack-Hale, 150.
48. Cubitt, 107.
49. Cf. Mamdani, Citizen and Subject; and Ekeh “Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa.”
50. Harris, Sierra Leone.
51. Piot, Remotely Global.
52. Interview, director, Freetown, July 4, 2011.
53. Maslow, “Theory of Human Motivation.”
54. Interview, director, Freetown, July 31, 2012.
55. Jantzi and Jantzi, “Development Paradigms.”
56. OECD, Civil Society and International Devleopment.
57. UNDP, Human Development Reports: Sierra Leone. http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/SLE,
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